UNJUST AND UNNATURAL WILLS.

over of collaterals in favor of others less needy: Conway v.
T/irard, 122 Ind. 266, particularly where the deceased never
regarded them as probable objects of his bounty: In re Skaat's
Will, 26 N. Y. S. 494.
It will be seen from the cases cited, as well as from many
others excluded from want of space, that while the number of
these contests is great the proportion of the successful is
small. This is as it should be, for in most instances they are
undertaken through personal animosity or in the hope of
extorting a compromise from the beneficiaries under the will.
Even in cases of seeming hardship it is seldom that success
can be predicted with any degree of confidence. As a means
of enforcing parental authority as a protection to the aged, and
the friendless from indifference and neglect, the courts firmly
maintain the testator's right to freely dispose of his property.
WM. HENRY LOYD, JR.
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Acceptance of a Guaranty-Concealmentof Factsby Guarantee.
A contract of suretyship or guaranty, like other contracts, requires the
concurrence of intention in two minds, one of whom promises something
to another who accepts. Consequently, a mere offer to guaranty is not
binding until acceptance by the person to whom it is made, and until
acceptance it is revocable.
Of the acceptance of an absolute guaranty notice is not requisite; but
of a mere offer of guaranty, the guarantee's acceptance must be notified
to the guarantor, such notification being of the essence of the agreement.
Unless interrogated, a creditor is under no obligation to disclose facts
in no manner connected with the business which is the subject of the
I Reported in 15 So. Rep. 649 (46 La. Ann.).
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suretyship, though such facts would probably have a decided influence
on the surety in entering into the contract; and the current and weight
of authority supports the proposition, that unless inquiry be made by the
guarantor, it is not obligatory upon the- guarantee to volunteer a disclosure of the debtor's previous embezzlement, and his failure to make
such a disclosure will not constitute a fraudulent concealment that will
operate the surety's discharge.
REQUISITES OF CONTRACTS OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY.

The contract of suretyship or guaranty is said to have been
"coeval with the first contracts recorded in history."
The Proverbs of Solomon contain more than one allusion
to sureties and suretyship, declaring it not only unwise, but as
indicating a lack of understanding, to enter into such an obligation (Prov. I I, 17, 22).' (See note, Story on Contracts,
§ 1107.)
However inconsistent it may be with the laws and teachings
of Solomon, selfishness and prudence have yielded to friendship and to the demands of social, and commercial affairs,
and we find the contract of a guarantor or surety to be an
important factor in commercial transactions, and an important
feature of commercial law. It has long been established
that "sureties are favorites of the law :" Lafayette v. James,
92 Ind. 240. "Nothing can be clearer," says Mr. Justice STORY, "both upon principle and authority, than the
doctrine that the liability of a surety is not to be extended by
implication beyond the terms of his contract. To the extent,
and in the manner and under the circumstances pointed out
in his obligation, he is bound, and no farther. It is not sufficient that he may sustain no injury by a change in the contract, or that it may even be for his benefit. He has a right
to stand upon the very terms of his contract; and if he does
not assent to any variation, and a variation is made, it is fatal.
And courts of equity, as well as of law, have been in the constant habit of scanning the contracts of sureties with considerable strictness:" Miller v. Stewart, 9 Wheat. 68o.
Not only has it been the inclination of the common law to
preserve to the fullest extent the rights of guarantors and
sureties in the construction and enforcement of their contracts,
regarding them as strkctisim luFs, but the statute law also
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las intervened for their protection by regulating the form of
their contracts; the fourth section of the Statute of Frauds
(29 Car. 2, C. 3) providing that ".No action shall be brought
whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to
-answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of another person,
unless the agreement, or some memorandum or note thereof,
shall be in writing and signed. by the party to be charged
therewith, or some other person thereunto by him lawfully
.authorized."
In some states this statute is in force, while in most of the
others the provision above quoted has been substantially
re-enacted. (See Baylies on Sureties and Guarantors, 62.)
Independent of this statutory requirement, the same essential
elements are required in the formation of a contract of
guaranty as in the formation of any other contract; they
-embrace (I) the mutual assent of the parties; (2) that the
parties be capable of contracting: (3) that the contract be
supported by a valuable consideration. (DeColyar on Guarantees, p. 2.)
With reference to the first element mentioned the same
author says (p. 2) : "Every contract includes a concurrence
of intention in two parties, one of whom promises something
to the other, who on his part accepts such promise. Until
therefore an acceptance be given (which must be an absolute
and unqualified acceptance of the previous offer), the promisor
is not liable."
Acteptance may assume three forms: (i) simple assent;
-(2) the giving of a promise; (3) the doing of an act. (Anson
on Contracts, 16). In the case of ordinary contracts any one
of these three modes of acceptance usually involves Per se, a
communication of the fact of acceptance to the promisor, but
in the case of a guaranty or suretyship, the acceptance or
performance of the consideration by the guarantee does not
necessarily involve a communication of that fact to the promisor
or guarantor; especially is this likely to be true where per-formance of the consideration or acceptance consists in the
-' doing of an act," for the peculiarity of the guarantor's
obligation is that the consideration for his undertaking moves
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toward and is received by his principal, who thereby has;
notice of the acceptance, while the guarantor*may not.
Such being the case a question of some nicety and importance frequently arises in determining under what circumstances
it is necessary, in order to bind the guarantor, that he be
notified of the acceptance of the guaranty by the guarantee.
This was one of the questions involved in the decision of
the principal case by the Supreme Court of Louisiana. Thesuit was founded upon the following instrument, viz.: "New
Orleans, June 4, 1891, Messrs- Lachman & Jacobi, San Francisco, Cal. Gentlemen: I hereby agree to become surety for
Henry Block & Bro., for the sum of $io,ooo, jointly and
severally with Henry Block & Bro. This agreement to bind
me in the sum of $Io,ooo, until the 15th day of October,
i89i. Very respectfully, (Signed), C. Lazard."
It appears that in order to secure a continuance of business
transactions (consignments of liquors) between the Lachman
firm and the Block Bros., the latter were requested by the
former to procure security ; this, it seems, was necessitated by
the fact that there had been an embezzlement or defalcation
by one of the latter firm, connected with previous transactions.
The above paper was executed and forwarded by the latter
firm to the former. One of the defenses urged was that there
was no acceptance of the guaranty on the part of the plaintiff.
Mr Justice WATKINS, after reviewing the provisions of the
Civil Code, in regard to the formation of contracts, including
the contract of suretyship, says (p. 65 I): "Applying them to
the agreement or proposition of the defendant, and it seems to
be clear that the plaintiffs were not bound to accept same
before it became complete, because it was made in terms
which evidence a design on the part of Lazard to give them
the right to conclude it by their simple assent; and the facts
disclosed by the record satisfy us that the plaintiffs acted on
the defendants' agreement to become surety for Henry Block
& Bro. by extending them a line of credit, they would not
otherwise have extended to them, and that this line of credit
began immediately after the receipt of the defendants' agreement, is evidenced by the items of the account sued on, and
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which are undenied. And if acceptance be deemed essential,
the circumstances clearly indicate plaintiffs' assent-such an
assent as puts it beyond the power of the defendant Lazard
to voluntarily withdraw from his engagement. Certain it is
that no formal notification of the creditor's acceptance is
required by our law as a condition precedent to the completion
of a contract of suretyship." The court further considered
the proposition of guaranty to be "absolute and unconditional
in its terms" and distinguished it from a mere offer of guaranty
which is not binding until acceptance by the person to whom
the offer is made, and which remains revocable until such
acceptance occurs."
This distinction is one which is recognized in principle, both
in this country and in England: De Colyar on Guarantees,
p. 2; Burge on Suretyship, 16; Pittman on Principal and
Surety, 28; 9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 78. The difficulty, however, arises in applying it to the varying circumstances of cases and in reconciling some of the cases in which
it -has been applied. In this connection, Brandt, in his treatise
or. Suretyship and Guaranty, p. 278, says: "When the
guaranty is a letter of credit, or is an offer to become responsible for a credit which may or may not be given to another at
the option of the party to whom the application for credit is
made, the great weight of authority is that the guarantor
must, within a reasonable time, be notified of the acceptance
of the guaranty .. . When the transaction is admitted to
amount only to an offer of guaranty, it is universally held that
in order to charge the party making the offer he must, within
a reasonable time, be notified that his offer is accepted. The
courts, however, differ-more or less as to what is a guaranty and
what is an offer to guaranty."
This doctrine has been firmly established by the Supreme
Court of the United States in a line of cases, beginning with a
dictum of Chief Justice MARSHALL, in Russell v. Clark's Rx'rs,
7 Cranch, 69-92 (1812), as follows: "The court cannot consider these letters as constituting a contract by which Clark
and Nightingale undertook to render themselves liable for the
engagement of Robert Murray & Co. to Nathaniel Russell.
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Had it been such a contract, it would certainly have been the
duty of the plaintiff to have given immediate notice to the
defendants of the extent of his engagement."
This same rule was announced by STORY, J., in Cremer v.
Higginson, I Mason, 323 (1817).

In Edinondston v. Drake, 5 Peters, 624 (1831), the same
court held that it was necessary, in order to charge the writer
of a letter of credit, that the person acting upon it should give
him notice that he had acted on it. In Douglass v. Reynolds,
7 Peters, I 13 (1833), action was brought upon the following
letter of guaranty: " Messrs. Reynolds, Byrne & Co.Gentlemen: Our friend Chester Haring, to assist him in busi,ness, may require your aid from time to time, either by accept.ances or endorsements of his paper, or advances in cash. In
-order to save you from harm in so doing, we do hereby bind
ourselves, severally and jointly, to be responsible to you at
any time, for a sum not exceeding $8,ooo, should the said
,Chester Haring fail to do so."
It was held by Mr. Justice STORY, "that to entitle the
plaintiffs to recover on the guarantee they must prove that
notice had been given to the defendants of that fact in a reasonable time after the guarantee had been accepted. .

.

. A party

giving a letter of guaranty has a right to know whether it is
accepted, and whether the person to whom it is addressed
means to give credit on the giving of it or not. It may be
most material, not only as to his responsibility, but as to
future rights and proceedings. It may regulate in a great
measure his course of conduct and his exercise of vigilance in
regard to the party in whose service it is given." This case
further decides, that in a continuing guaranty notice need not
be given of each credit allowed, but that notice should be
given of the total responsibility of the guarantees following the
last transaction; and also, that notice should be given of
demand and non-payment by the principal debtor within a
reasonable time.
Lee v. Dick, IO Peters, 482 (1836), was based upon the
following letter: "Messrs. N. & J. Dick & Co.-Gentlemen:
Nightingale & Dexter, of Maury Co., Tenn., wish to draw on
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you at 6 or 8 months date, you will please accept their draft
for $2ooo, and I do hereby guaranty the punctual payment of
it. Very respectfully your obedient servant, Sam'l B. Lee."
Mr. Justice THOIPSON held that the guarantees should
have given notice either of an intention to accept, or that they
had accepted and acted upon the guarantee, but the court
refused to lay down any rule with respect to the time within
which such notice must be given.
The case of Douglass v. Reynolds, supra, appeared before the
-court again in 1838 (12 Peters, 497), and the rule before laid
down as to notice of acceptance was adhered to; Mr. Justice
MCLEAN said, however, "this notice need .not be proved to
have been given in writing or in any particular form, but may
be inferred by the jury from facts and circumstances which
shall warrant such inference."
In Adams'v. Jones, 12 Peters, 207 (1838), Mr. Justice
STORY used the following language: "and the question which
under this view is presented, is whether upon a letter of
guaranty addressed to a particular person or to persons
generally, for a future credit to be given to the party in whose
favor the guaranty is -drawn, notice is necessary to be given to
.he guarantor that the person giving the credit has accepted or
acted upon the guaranty, and given the credit on the faith of it.
We are all of the opinion that is necessary, and this is not now
open to question in this court, after the decisions which have
been made in Russell v. Clarke, 7 Cranch, 69 ; Edmondston v.
Drake, 5 Peters, 624; Douglass v. Reynolds, 7 Id. I 13; Lee v.
Dick, IO Id. 482; and again recognized at the present term
in the case of Reynolds v. Douglass. It is in itself a reasonable
rule, enabling the guarantor to know the nature and extent of
his liability; to exercise due vigilance in guarding himself
against losses, which might otherwise be unknown to him,
and to avail himself of the appropriate means in law and
equity, to compel the other parties to discharge him from
further responsibility."
The doctrine of the foregoing cases has been ably criticised
by Judge HARE in his note to Douglass v. Reynolds (2 American Lead. Cases, 5th Ed. 59); on page 94, he says: "It

REQUISITES OF CONTRACTS

becomes plain that the numerous instances in which notice of
acceptance has been held essential to the obligation of guaranties, imply and depend upon the single proposition that
assent cannot give rise to a contract, unless each party knows
or is informed that the other has agreed, which may be true
when the obligation of the contract is meant to be reciprocal
and mutual, but not when the sole object is to induce the performance of an act which is subsequently performed."
And Justice COWEN, in Douglass v. Howland, 24 Wend. 35,
says: "The short answer which the English Cases, decided
long before our revolution, furnish, is that the guarantor, by
inquiring of his principal, with whom he is presumed to be on
intimate terms, may inform himself perfectly whether the
guaranty were accepted, the conditions fulfilled and payment
made."
The next case was Davisv. Wells, 104 U. S. 159 (1881),
concerning the following guaranty: "For and in consideration
of $I to us in hand paid by Wells, Fargo & Co., (the receipt
of which is hereby acknowledged), we hereby guarantee unto
them, the said Wells, Fargo & Co., unconditionally at all times,
any indebtedness of Gordon & Co ....
to the extent of and
not exceeding $io,ooo for any overdrafts now made, or that
may hereafter be made, at the bank of said Wells, Fargo & Co.
This guaranty to be an open one and to continue one at all
times to the amount of $io,ooo until revoked by us in
writing, &c."
Mr. Justice

MATTHEWS,

referring to the rule requiring notice

of acceptance, said: "There seems to be some confusion as
to the reason and foundation of the rule, and consequently
some uncertainty as to the circumstances in which it is applicable. In some instances it has been treated as a rule inhering
in the very nature and definition of every contract, which
requires the assent of a party to whom a proposal is made to
be signified to the party making it, in order to constitute a.
binding promise; in others it has been considered as a rule
springing from the peculiar nature of a contract of guaranty,
which requires after the formation of the obligation of the
guarantor, and as one of its incidents, that notice should be
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given of the intention of the guarantee to act under it, as a
condition of the promise of the guarantor. The former is the
sense in which the rule is to be understood as having been
applied in the decisions of this court. . . . The rule in
question proceeds upon the ground that the case in which it
applies is an offer or proposal on the part of the guarantor,
which does not become effective and binding as an obligation
until accepted by the party to whom it is made; that until
then it is inchoate and incomplete and may be withdrawn by
the proposer."
"Frequently the only consideration contemplated is, that the
guarantee shall extend the credit and make the advances to
the third person, for whose performance of his obligation, on
that account, the guarantor undertakes. But a guaranty may
as well be for an existing debt or it may be supported by some
consideration distinct from the advance to the principal debtor
passing directly from the guarantee to the guarantor. In the
case of the guaranty of an existing debt such a consideration
is necessary to support the undertaking as a binding obligation.
In both these cases no notice of assent other than the performance of the consideration is necessary to perfect the
agreement, for, as Professor Langdell has pointed out in his
summary of the Law of Contract, p. 987: 'Though the
acceptance of an offer and the performance of the consideration are different things, and the former does not imply the
latter, yet the latter does necessarily imply the former, and as
the want of either is fatal to the promise, the question whether
an offer has been accepted can never in strictness become
material in those cases in which a consideration is necessary,
and for all practical purposes it may be said that the offer is
accepted in such cases by giving or performing the consideration.'" The court held in this case that the recital of considerations in the instrument, made it a "complete and perfect obligation of guaranty" upon delivery, and that, therefore,
notice of acceptance was unnecessary.
It is interesting to compare this case with the following case
of Davis Sewing Machine Co. v. Richards, 115 U. S. 524 (I885),
which involved the following writing: "For value received, we
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hereby guarantee to the Davis Sewing Machine Company, of
Watertown, N. Y., the full performance of the foregoing contract on the part of John W. Poler, and the payment by said
John W. Poler of all indebtedness by account, note, indorsement of notes (including renewals and extensions) or otherwise,
to the said Davis Sewing Machine Company, for property sold to
said John W. Poler under this contract to the amount of $3ooo."
It was held by Mr. Justice GRAY, that there was "no evidence
of any request from the plaintiff corporation to the guarantors,
or of any consideration moving from it and received or
acknowledged by them at the time of their signing the guaranty. The general words at the beginning of the guaranty,
"value received," without stating from whom, are quite as
consistent with a consideration received by the guarantees
from the principal debtor only."
The contract was held to be incomplete, and the guarantee
was not liable for the price of goods sold by the company to
the agent and not paid for by him.
The court summarized the rules upon the subject as follows: "A contract of guaranty, like every other contract,
can only be made by the mutual assent of the parties. If the
guaranty is signed by the guarantor, at the request of the
other party, or if the latter's agreement to accept is contemporaneous with the guaranty; or if the receipt from him
of a valuable consideration, however small, is acknowledged in the guaranty, the mutual assent is proved, and the
delivery of the guaranty to him or for his use completes the
contract. But if the guaranty is signed by the guarantor,
without any previous request of the other party, and in his
absence, for no consideration moving between them, except
future advances to be made to the principal debtor, the guaranty is in legal effect an offer or proposal on the part of the
guarantor, needing an acceptance by the other party to complete the contract."
These latest two decisions by the court, which was foremost
in announcing the doctrine in this country, illustrate how
closely the line is drawn in applying the principles to cases
where the facts differ but slightly.
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The rules of law (supra) upon which the decision in the
Davis Sewing MIVfchine Co. case was based, seem to be somewhat in conflict with those which governed the ruling of the
Supreme Court of Louisiana in the principal case. The latter
decision is based upon the provisions of the Rev. Civ. Code
(La.), relating to contracts in general, article 1802 of which
declares that a proposer "is bound by his proposition, and the
signification of his dissent will be of no avail f the proposition
be made in terms which evidence a design to give the other party
the rzit of concluding the contract by his assent, etc." The
court considered, in the first place, that the absolute character
of the instrument implied a waiver of any acceptance, further
than a mental one, uncommunicated, followed by acting'upon
the proposition; second, that no notice of acceptance was
required, inasmuch as a failure by the guaranfee to dissent
from the proposition within a reasonable time iplied notice of
such fact. The court referred to the case of Pope v. Andrews,
9 Car. & P., 564, *as supporting the latter proposition, this
case, however, does not seem to have been a suit upon a
guaranty, nor did it involve the question as to the right of a
guarantor to insist upon notice of acceptance in order to bind
him. And Mcver v. Richardson, I M. & S., 557, which did
involve that question, appears to have been decided the other
way.
Upon the first point the court differs from those decisions,
which seem to place the contract of guaranty upon a slightly
different footing from ordinary contracts, as regards the
question of acceptance. For instance, in Oaks v. Weller, 13
Vt. 1 lO, it was said: "When a proposition is made by a man
for a thing to be done for himself, he must know, when done,
that it is done on his proposition. But when he proposes, his
responsibility for a thing to be done for another, he may not
know that it is done, or even if he does, he will not know
whether it is done on his proposition or on the sole credit of
the third person, or some other security. The responsibilities
and duties of a guarantor imply certain correlative rights and
.privileges, which, withont notice of his condition, he can never
exercise."
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PETERS, J., in Steadman v. Guthrie, 4 Met., (Ky.,) 156, said:
"It is a general rule, that if a person offer to pay money upon
the performance of an act by another, the performance of. the
act by the latter, without any notice of his acceptance of the
offer, or of his intent to act upon it, gives him a right to
demand the money. . . . But where the offer is to guaranty,
a debt for which another is primarily liable in consideration of
some act to be performed by the creditor, mere performance
of the act is not sufficient to fix the liability of the guarantor,
but the creditor must notify the guarantor of his acceptance of
the offer, or of his intent to act upon it."
In the case of Gardner v. Lloyd, Iio Pa., 278, the court;
DEAN, J., said: " Men are bound to pay their own debts; in
the absence of an express contract, the law implies one, but it
will imply no contract to pay other men's debts, nor any
essential element of such contract,, such as waiver of notice
where the settled law requires notice that an offer to guarantee
has been accepted."
Mr. Justice KNOWLTON, in the recent case of Bishop v.
Eaton, 37 N. E. (Mass.) 665 (1894), lays down a doctrine
which seems to be on the medium line and very reasonable.
The proposition of guaranty was in these words: "If Harry
needs more money, let him have it or assist him to get, and
I will see that it is paid." The court held it to be "an offer
to become effectual as a contract upon the doing of the act
referred to. It was an offer to be bound in consideration of
an act to be done, and in such a case the doing of the act constitutes the acceptance of the offer, and furnishes the consideration. Ordinarily, there is no occasion to notify the offerer of
the acceptance of such an offer, for the doing of the act is a
sufficient acceptance, and the promisor knows that he is
bound when he sees that action has been taken on the faith of
his offer.
. "But if the act is of such a kind that knowledge of it will not
quickly come to the promisor, the promisee is bound to give
him notice of his acceptance within a reasonable time after
doing that, which constituted the acceptance.
"In such a case it is implied in the offer that to complete the
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contract, notice shall be given with due diligence, so that the
promisor may know that a contract has been made. But
-where the promise is in consideration of an act to be done, it
,becomes binding upon the doing of the act, so far that the
promisee cannot be affected by a subsequent withdrawal of it,
if, within a reasonable time afterwards, he notifies the promisor.
In accordance with these principles it has been held in cases
like the present, when the guarantor would not know of him:self from the nature of the transaction, whether the offer has
been accepted or not, that he is not bound without notice of
the acceptance, seasonably given after the performance which
constitutes the consideration."
These principles are in harmony with those announced in
;the principal case, excepting that notice is held requisite when
-the act of acceptance is "of such a kind that knowledge of it
'will not quickly come to the promisor."
But it is a difficult and not altogether profitable task to
.attempt to distinguish cases and reconcile decisions upon this
question: "The rights and duties of parties to guaranties
must, from the variety of circumstances under which they
have been entered into, be materially governed by the particular circumstances of each case:" 2 Am. L. C. 87.
The distinguishing feature of the guaranty in the principal
-case was, that it purported to be a present, absolute under-taking, in which the liability was limited and made certain as
to duration and amount; no consideration, however, was
mentioned or suggested therein.
In the following cases the guaranty was held to be complete, and notice not necessary: Davis v. Wells, supra; Johnson v. Bailey, 15 S.,W. (Texas) 499; Klosterman v. Ocott,
41 N. W. (Neb.) 250; Taylor v. Tolman Co., 47 Ill. App.
264; Nading v.McGregor, 23 N. E. (Ind.) 283 ; Currie Fer.4ilizer Co. v.Byfteld, 34 N. E. (Ind.) 451 ; Hall v. Weaver,34
Fed. io4; Doud v.Nat. Park Bank, 54 Fed. 846.
Where the contract guarantied or agreement to accept is
-contemporaneous with the guaranty, notice is not necessary:
Wildes v. Savage, I Story, 22; Bechtold v. Lyon, 29 N. E.
.(Ind.) 912 ; Wright v. Gtifflth, 121 Ind.478 ; Lemp v. Armen-
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gol, 26 S. W. (Tex.) 941.

Nor where there has been a pre--

cedent request: Hassehnan v. Japanese Co., 27 N. E. (Ind.).
318; contra, Kay v. Allen, 9 Pa. 320.
Where the consideratiou for the guaranty moves indirectly
toward the guarantor, no notice is necessary: Doud v. NatPark Bank, 54 Fed. 846; Nading v. McGregor, 23 N. E_
(Ind.) 283.
In these cases the rule requiring notice of acceptance tocomplete the contract of guaranty has been adopted: Davis
Sewing Machine Co. v. Richards, supra; Winnebago Paper
Mills v. Travis, 58 N. W. (Minn.) 36; Patterson v. Reed, 7 W.
& S. 144; Emersonv. Graf,5 Casey, 358; Kayv. Allen, 9 Pa
320; Kello-gg v. Stockton, 29 Pa. 464; Coe v. Buehler, IIO Pa.
366; Gardner v. Lloyd, i1O Pa. 278; Steadman v. Guthrie,
4 Met. (Ky.) 156; Ruffner v. Love, 33 Ill. App. 6o; Newman
v. Streator, 19 Il.App. 594; Rankin v. Chlds, 9 Mo.674;
Mussey v. Rayner, 22 Pick. 223 ; Allen v. Pike, 3 Cush. 238;
Bishop v. Eaton, supra; Wilkins v. Carter, 19 S. W. (Texas)
997; Oaks v. Weller, I3 Vt. no; Hill v. Calvin, 4 How.
(Miss.) 231; Walker v. Forbes, 25 Ala. 139; McCollum v.
Cushing, 22 Ark. 540; Bank v. Sloo, 16 La. 539, and see
cases cited in Brandt on Suretyship, sec. 186, note I ; and in
9 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, p. 78, 79.
Notice may be inferred from facts and circumstances:
Reynolds v. Douglass, 12 Peters, 497; Raffner v. Love, 33 Ill.
App. 6oi.
Knowledge from any source is equivalent to notice: Powell
v. Chicago Carpet Co.,

22

Ill. App. 409; Tolman Co.v. Means,

52 Mo. App. 385; Mitchell v. Railton, 45 Mo. App. 273 ;
WSebster v. Smitz. 30 N. E. (Ind.) 139.
Notice may be waived: Fisk v. Stone, 5o N. W. (Dakota)
125.

Closely allied to the guarantee's duty to give notice of
acceptance is the duty to make disclosure of facts affecting the
liability of the guarantor and material to the subject-matter of
his contract.
This was a second question involved in the case under consideration : "Was it the duty of Lachman & Jacobi to have
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given information to C. Lazard, of Henry Block's defalcation
and embezzlement in anticipation of the former becoming the
surety or guarantor for the latter's firm?" The court disposed
of the question as follows : " It is our deliberate conviction
that such embezzlement did not constitute a fact material to
the agreement, or transaction of suretyship, or guaranty, and
it was not necessary for the guarantees to disclose it, and that
their failure to disclose it does not operate the release or dis.charge of the defendant." A review of the decisions upon
this question does not come within the scope of this annotation, as such relates to the discharge of the surety by the
fraud of the creditor.
De Colyar points out (p. 26o) that, under the English
authorities, Yno concealment will vitiate a guaranty unless it
befrzidulent."
. It was said in L'isurance Co. v. Lloyd, 10 Ex. 523, that "the
mere relation of principal and surety does not require the
voluntary disclosure of all the material facts in all cases. The
same rule as to disclosures does not apply in cases of principal
and surety as in cases of insurance on ships and lives."
Lord CAMPBELL'S criterion as to Whether a disclosure should
be made voluntarily was "whether there is anything that
might not naturally be expected to take place between the
parties who are concerned in the transaction:" Hamglton v.
Watson, 12 C. & F. 109.
In Magee v. Manhattan Ins. Co., 92 U. S. 93, Mr. Justice
SWAYNE said: "But there is a duty incumbent on him, (the
surety). He must not rest supine, close his eyes and fail to
seek important information within his reach. If he does this
and a loss occurs he. cannot, in the absence of fraud on the
part of the creditor, set up as a defence, facts then first
learned, which he ought to have known and considered before
entering into the contract." The decision in this case was
similar to the one under discussion.
STAYTON, C. J., in Screwinen's Assn. v. Smih, 7 S. W.
(Texas) 793, suggests the difficulty in the surety securing
from his principal truthful admissions of moral delinquency as
distinguished from matters showing him to be merely negli-

272

REQUISITES OF CONTRACTS, &C.

gent, dilatory or unskillful though not dishonest. The court
thinks that in the one case disclosure should be made, while in
the other it need not.
See cases cited in 24 Am. & En. Ency. of Law (Suretyship),
793, and Brandt on Suretyship, Sec. 419, et seq.
It does seem that in those cases where the opportunity to
obtain information exists, the creditor should be entitled to
presume that the surety has availed himself of it, and not be
required to volunteer the disclosure, especially in view of the
fact that the very purpose of a guaranty or suretyship is to
provide against possible risk, and the relation between the
principal and surety being presumed to be intimate, the latter
should be vigilant and guard himself, else he must realize the
truth of Solomon's saying: "He that is surety for a stranger
shall smart for it; and he that hateth suretyship is sure."

G. HERBERT JENKINS.
Philadelphia,April, 1895.

